The software defined networking paradigm relies on the programmability of the network to automatically perform management and reconfiguration tasks. The result of adopting this programmability feature is twofold: first by designing new solutions and, second, by concurrently making room for the exploitation of new security threats. As a malfunction in the controller software may lead to a collapse of the network, assessing the security of solutions before their deployment, is a major concern in SDNs. In light of this, we have conducted a comprehensive review of the literature on the experimental security analysis of the control plane in SDNs, with an emphasis on vulnerabilities of the controller software. Additionally, we have introduced a taxonomy of the techniques found in the literature with regard to the experimental security analysis of SDN controller software. Furthermore, a comparative study has been carried out of existing experimental approaches considering the security requirements defined by the Open Network Foundation (ONF). As a result, we highlighted that there is a need for a standardization of the methodologies employed for automated security analysis, that can meet the appropriate requirements, and support the development of reliable and secure software for SDNs.
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Networks (SDNs) [1] . The flexibility provided by network programmability allows several solutions to be deployed for complex tasks and thus reduces the need to replace the hardware/firmware of network devices. Among the many advantages of using SDNs, is that it enables autonomic services to be installed which are aimed at the optimization of network metrics, network virtualization, migration, mobility and energy conservation [2] . Unlike the case of traditional network architecture, in a SDN, the switches comprise the data plane and have two key features. First, the switches interact with a logical network control entity, known as the SDN controller, to obtain forwarding instructions. Second, they keep a flow table in which entries with instructions are stored and evaluated so that they can carry out the forwarding of packets [3] . Generally, the function of the SDN controller is operated by non-standard software that provides the necessary interfaces for network services and management. In SDNs, the interaction between switches and controllers generally occurs through an application programming interface (API). The OpenFlow (OF) [4] protocol is recognized as the standard API for SDN and it is recommended by the guidelines of the Open Network Foundation (ONF)
2 . Hence, the applications hosted by the controller can implement policies, routing algorithms and other management services (e.g. load balancing, virtualization, support for mobility etc.) to determine a set of entries in the flow tables of the switches. Thus, the controller and applications act as the "brain" of the network by forming the logical network control.
Security in SDN is a major concern that has recently attracted the attention of the scientific community [5, 6] . This can be explained by the fact that the programmability and centralized management of SDNs may either assist in the implementation of security services or lead to the emergence of new security threats which may compromise data and the network operations [7] . Comparatively, SDNs are more vulnerable to attacks than legacy networks [5] . It is noteworthy that the OF specifications stipulate that communication between the controller(s) and switch(es) must occur through a secure channel, that is, it must be implemented by secure transport services (e.g. TLS). As well as this, owing to the fact that many interfaces/operations in SDNs are not standardized, there is no guarantee that any single mechanism can ensure proper security.
For this reason, the scientific community has dedicated a great deal of effort to investigating potential security risks in SDNs [8] . On the one hand, one may observe in the related literature the existence of several papers concerned with i) carrying out reviews of security in SDNs, ii) defining concepts in theoretical terms and iii) discussing possible security vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures [9, 7, 10, 11, 12] . On the other hand, an attempt has been made to conduct experimental security analysis with focus on the detection of vulnerabilities in different planes of the SDN architecture. In addition, another important factor that should be taken into account is the set of security requirements applicable to each SDN plane. In specific terms, in the control plane context, [13] describe the security requirements for SDN controllers, that are derived from an analysis and classification of threats defined by the ONF in [14] . However, as there is a great heterogeneity of methods designed for experimental security evaluation in the literature, it is necessary to understand which of them can be applied to assess the fulfillment of the recommended security requirements by the controller software implementations.
In view of this, we present in this paper the results of an extensive review of the most recent literature dedicated to the experimental security analysis of controller software in SDNs. Our research study complements the findings of current surveys that focus on general aspects of SDN security, e.g. [5, 7, 15, 16, 3] , by providing a broader discussion of the techniques employed in the literature for the experimental security analysis of controller software. In addition, we introduce a taxonomy of the approaches found in the literature review and conduct a comparative analysis of them considering the security requirements defined by the ONF and the STRIDE security threat categorization model [17] .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we describe the theoretical concepts of SDNs with focus on its architecture, main components and security threats. In Section 3, we carry out an extensive literature review with regard to the security analysis of controllers and other closely-related components of SDNs. A discussion about the data collected during the literature review is presented in Section 4. Following this, we introduce a taxonomy and a discussion of the main methods employed for the experimental security evaluation of SDN controllers in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. Finally, we summarize the conclusions of the paper in Section 7.
SDN: Architecture and Security Threats
The purpose of the paradigm adopted by the SDNs is to decouple logical network control from packet forward by dividing the networking tasks into three planes: the data plane, the control plane and the application/management plane [3] . Figure 1 shows an overview of the SDN architecture with the three planes included. In the SDN architecture, the interaction between the network components in each plane occurs through specific interfaces. In this case, each interface is classified as belonging to one of the four extremities of the architecture: northbound, southbound, westbound and eastbound [2] .
The data plane essentially consists of network switches that forward frames, belonging to each flow, to other devices by means of a set of locally-installed flow rules. The SDN controller is able to configure the forward task by installing the flow rules into the switches proactively or reactively. In the reactive forwarding, on receiving the first frame of a flow, a switch usually requests the SDN controller to lay down the rules regarding that individual flow, and to keep those rules active until the end of each stream. In the proactive forwarding, the controller sends a set of rules to the switches that are defined a priori for each flow. In the absence of a rule for a specific received flow, the switch may query the controller to obtain the new rule or forward the flow in the traditional way in accordance with a prior configuration of the device. In the control plane, the controller acts as a network operating system (NOS) and provides the basic abstractions and functionalities needed for the implementation of the forward policies defined by the management entity of an Autonomous System (AS). Controllers can communicate with each other to ensure distributed network control. Alternatively, a controller can interact either with other controllers belonging to a different AS or with legacy devices by means of the westbound and eastbound interfaces, respectively [18] . In addition, a controller can interact with the data plane through southbound protocols. In this particular situation, although there exist several APIs and protocols designed for SDNs, (such as the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) [19] , the Open vSwitch Database Management Protocol (OVSDB) [20] and the Protocol-oblivious forwarding (POF) [21] ), the OpenFlow protocol emerged as a de facto standard owing to its wide acceptance by practitioners and manufacturers [3] .
The application/management plane allows the network management entity to monitor and execute control operations on the SDN, usually by interacting with the controller(s) via northbound APIs/protocols, (e.g. RESTFUL APIs or programming languages [3] ). It should be mentioned that, although the theoretical SDN architecture suggests that the application and control planes software are completely independent, this premise is rejected by the current state of SDN controller software implementations. Generally, both the control and application are a part of the same software and share computational resources. In light of this, the northbound interface is often used by the applications for communication with external entities instead of the controller. Hence , as applications may operate as plug-ins or particular modules tied to the controller software, it is not unusual to experience collateral damage to the controller software caused by the malfunction of some application.
Security in SDNs is an important research field because the programmability and centralized management of SDNs may either assist in the implementation of security services or lead to the emergence of new security threats which , in turn, can compromise data and the network operation [7] . Comparatively, the SDNs are more vulnerable to attacks than legacy networks [5] . In this sense one may enumerate at least seven possible points of attack in SDNs (as shown in Figure 1 ), which are as follows: the SDN switch, the data communication between switches, the SDN controller, the southbound communication between controller(s) and the switch(es), the east/westbound communication between controllers or between application/management software, the northbound communication between the controller and the application/management software and the management/application software. It should be noted that the OpenFlow specifications state that communication between the SDN controller(s) and the switch(es) must occur through a secure channel (e.g. by using TLS). Despite this, largely owing to a lack of standardization, there are no guarantees that the current mechanisms are suitable and can meet all the security requirements of SDNs.
Keeping these points in mind, in the next section, we outline the state-ofthe-art with regard to the experimental security analysis of controller software in SDNs.
Literature Review
For this review, we carried out a rigorous and extensive verification of the literature by checking the bibliographic repositories available on the Internet. We selected a set of papers considering only the most relevant studies fully or partially dedicated to the experimental security analysis of the controller software in SDNs. More specifically, the literature review mainly includes studies related to the following controllers: OpenDayLight, Floodlight, Beacon, Ryu, POX, ONOS, NOX, Maestro and their variants.
Whilst there exist multiple solutions for south-bound SDN interfaces, e.g., PCEP [22] , NETCONF [23] , P4 [24] , ForCES [19] , I2RS [25] , the OpenFlow [4] is by far the most widespread existing solution. Thus, by examining the most recent experimental analyses of security issues with regard to open SDN controllers in the literature, we necessarily report studies related to innate OpenFlow-based SDNs. For further detail about the security analysis of other south-bound protocols in SDNs, the reader should refer to [26] .
Among the set of analyzed papers presenting practical and theoretical results, we selected only the experimental studies to be described in the following subsections. For ease of understanding, the selected papers were grouped according to the main focus of each experiment carried out, as depicted in Figure  2 , in: data plane; application and management plane; control plane and regardless the SDN plane. After describing the selected experimental studies in this section, we provide a comprehensive analysis of their security aspects in Section 4 and Section 5. 
Security Analysis in the Data Plane
In this section we describe the experimental security analysis with regard to the data plane, presented in [27] , [28] and [29] , respectively.
The authors of [27] analyzed the effects of overhead on the routing tables of the SDN switches. As an experiment, the authors implemented a scenario in which an attack was carried out by continuously sending several flows of forged raw packets. In this case, only a small portion of the packet header was changed between streams, so that an individual entry could be inserted into the switch for each forged packet until the storage capacity was exhausted. According to the authors of [27] , when the resources of the switch are exhausted, the controller is unable to install new entries for legitimate flows. To mitigate this type of attack, they recommend that the controller should either wait until a flow entry expires before inserting a new entry of a legitimate flow or directly forward the legitimate flow through to another switch. The authors also conducted tests to measure the delay, throughput, and packet drop rate when the flow table is exhausted. The measurements were performed on the OpenDayLight (ODL) controller that was configured with the two mitigation strategies. The tests considered legitimate flows with only a subset of entries already installed in the switch and forged flows with no related entries in the switch tables. As a result, the evaluation detected a performance degradation in the controller. In addition, the tests also revealed a degradation in the throughput of the legitimate flows when there were no entries installed in the switch; this was mainly due to the extra work carried out by the controller to forward the packets to other switches.
The authors of [28] introduced a prevention scheme against attacks originating in compromised OpenFlow switches. A system scenario is defined in which a compromised switch is able to launch three types of active attacks, namely, incorrect forwarding (deviation or duplication of a flow), packet manipulating and a malicious weight adjustment of the compromised switch group tables. The authors created two algorithms to detect these attack vectors. The purpose of the first algorithm, called Forwarding Detection, is to verify if the flows are being correctly routed by the switches. To do this , the algorithm uses an artificial packet to check the flow entries in the switch tables and tracks the path traveled by the flow to determine the correctness of the path. The second algorithm, called Weighting Detection, is used to check if the switch forwards packets at an expected rate. The algorithm generates and sends a set of artificial packets to the evaluated switches and analyses the amount of received packets. If the number of received packets is close to the expected value, the flow is considered to be satisfactory; otherwise the flow is compromised.
Recently, in [29] the authors evaluated the link discovery service (LDS) vulnerability, which is an essential service of the control plane that is needed for the proper operation of SDN services and applications. The authors provided details of how an attacker can "poison" the perception of the SDN controller about the network topology, by introducing false links. They also explained that such links can be created through the use of false Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) messages, sent by one or more compromised hosts. As a result, the authors were able to simulate a scenario of a realistic link falsification attack on the FloodLight controller implemented on the Mininet emulator.
Security Analysis in the Application Plane
In this section we describe different approaches in the literature committed to assess experimentally the security of the application plane and the interfaces for communication with the control plane.
The study [30] discusses the application failures that can result in the crash of the SDN controller. More specifically, the authors address the problem of failstop crash failures and Byzantine faults. The authors claim that the availability of a SDN controller is decreased by the sharing of resources between the SDN applications and controllers. This means that the crash of the former induces the crash of the latter, and hence affects availability. They also examine the relationship between applications and the network, where a Byzantine failure may lead to the violation of network safety property and thus affect network availability. In view of this, the authors re-design the SDN controller architecture by focusing on a set of abstractions to increase the resilience of controllers to faults caused by applications. This new design has two objectives: to isolate the applications of the controller in order to eliminate resource sharing and isolate the network from application to allow consistent support for applications. The authors tested and validated the new architecture by creating a FloodLight-based isolation system called LegoSDN and discussed the hypothetical challenges of their prototype.
The authors of [31] argue that application failures may either lead to losses in the control plane or cause the permanent failure of the network operations. They claim that problems caused by application failures directly interfere with the proper functioning of the SDN controllers. Moreover, they indicate a lack of solutions for this problem in the existing controllers. For this reason, they developed a new controller called Rosemary, in order to offer more resilience to application faults. The main features of Rosemary are a) its ability to isolate the controller from applications, b) it can spawn applications as independent processes, and also c) to monitor and control the resources of each application. The authors compare Rosemary with three other controllers, namely, NOX, Beacon and FloodLight. In the experimental analysis, they performed crash tests of controllers induced by applications, memory leakage tests in the controllers and unauthorized access test of memory structures. The NOX, Beacon and FloodLight controllers failed the tests, while Rosemary proved to be resistant to the attacks due to the isolation provided by its architecture. Finally, the authors carried out a performance comparison, which took account of the flow rate, where the performance of Rosemary was far superior to that of FloodLight and NOX but, in general, was similar to that of Beacon.
In [32] , the authors introduced attacks in the application plane in which an adversary spreads malicious applications to compromise the operation of the network and also discussed possible protective mechanisms against such attacks. They carried out three case studies of attacks that were triggered by malicious applications installed in the FloodLight, ONOS, and OpenDayLight controllers. The authors argue that a permission-checking mechanism could be implemented to protect against these attacks. Moreover, in addition to this mechanism, they also suggest conducting a static source code analysis and a dynamic analysis based on code coverage test of the target application.
Security Analysis in the Control Plane
Here we describe the approaches employed for assessing security in the control plane and comparing the communication interfaces with the other planes in SDNs.
The authors of [33] investigate the impact of software aging (SA) on SDN controllers. The concept of SA was used to analyze the performance and security of a system by observing the operating conditions of a software over an extended period of time. The authors analyzed the impact of the SA on the FloodLight and Beacon controllers. In the experiments, the controllers remained in operation for 36 hours, with alternating periods of high workload and idleness lasting for twenty and five minutes, respectively. The authors used the cbench tool to generate the workload (packet-in flows) for 16 Openflow switches at a rate of 100.000 flows/s. As a result, it was found that FloodLight used all the available resident memory (4.2GB) of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) as well as all the virtual memory, including that stored on disk, making a total of 8GB of memory consumption. The memory management of Beacon was better since it used approximately 500MB of resident memory and 5GB of virtual memory.
The study carried out by [34] is concerned with unauthorized access to SDN controllers including threats originating from applications. The authors propose a set of Authorization and Access Control rules as well as a reference monitor named OperationCheckpoint, which is coupled to the FloodLight controller. The improvements include the following: a) the definition of a set of rules for the OpenFlow commands of a given application, b) the creation of unique identifiers (IDs) for applications, c) Permission Management and d) persistent records of actions and access to the controller. The authors validated the scheme by evaluating the OperationCheckpoint in an environment emulated with Mininet. The experiments were divided into two scenarios: one considering access to the REST API and another considering access to the internal Java methods implemented in the controller. The proposed OperationCheckpoint prevented access to calls for the REST API methods, but allowed calls made through Java methods due to the internality of Java. Finally, the authors measured the latency that was introduced by using the OperationCheckpoint. There was an average increase of approximately 367.125µs in the latency of the operations performed by the controller.
Similarly to [34] , the authors of [35] designed a configurable mechanism to restrict access to system-level operations through the application of security policies. The purpose of the system is to maintain control over third-party applications installed in the SDN controller and thus prevent attacks resulting from malicious actions. In the mechanism, each network service that can carry out sensitive operations, is held in a sandbox. Two modes of operation were defined: detection and protection. In the detection mode, the operations are monitored and the security breaches are only recorded in the log file. In the protection mode, sandboxes can restrict the execution of operations by complying with the security rules defined by the network administrator. The mechanism was implemented and validated in the OpenDaylight controller within the Mininet environment. The authors validated the mechanism by conducting effectiveness and performance tests. The purpose of the effectiveness test was to determine whether the security rules were being enforced for the strict execution of operations from two different applications. It was found that the mechanism was able to contain the malicious operations satisfactorily in the tests. As a result of the performance test, it was verified a reduction of less than 5% in the effective transmission rate of the network due the control overload introduced by the proposed mechanism.
The authors of [36] investigated the vulnerabilities in the OpenDayLight controller with regard to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. The study addresses two variants of threat vectors, namely, threats in the communication of the control plane and threats in the controller. The authors presented a MitM attack, which intercepted messages between the SDN controller and a remote client, with the aim of capturing the credentials of the controller. When carrying out the attack, the authors assumed a scenario where the adversary is located on the same LAN as the SDN controller and can capture packets. For this reason, they executed the MitM attack on the communication of a remote terminal and the OpenDayLight controller via the web DLUX interface of the controller. In the experiment, the adversary captured HTTP (non-SSL) messages exchanged between the web DLUX interface and the remote terminal. As a result, the credentials of the controller were captured in plain text. [16] conducted an experimental performance analysis of the respective open source controllers: NOX, POX, Beacon, FloodLight, MuL, Maestro and Ryu. The selected controllers were compared in terms of performance, scalability, reliability and security metrics. The flow rate and latency metrics were used to measure performance and scalability and covered scenarios in which the number of hosts ranged from 1 to 256 and the number of switches from 10 3 to 10 7 . In the case of the reliability analysis, the authors measured the number of connection failures and packet losses that occurred during an operational period of 24 hours by examining workload values between 2, 000 and 18, 000 requests per second. Finally, when investigating security issues, five types of malformed OpenFlow packets were created to observe the behavior of the controller on receiving these packets. As result of the experiments, it was noted that the Beacon controller had a higher flow rate while the POX, NOX and Ryu had a very low flow rate. In addition, Mul and Beacon had the lowest latencies. With regard to reliability, Mul and Maestro presented higher packet drop rate than the other controllers. Finally, despite having a poor performance, RYU achieved the best security classification level.
The authors of [37] designed a new extension for the NOX controller, called FortNOX, which implements a role-based authorization strategy, security restrictions and conflicts resolution between flow rules. FortXOX enables NOX to check for real-time flow rule conflict. FortNOX employs a rule-based representation method, called alias reduced rules (ARRs), and detects conflicts by comparing the set of ARRs and the new installed rules. The authors validated the scheme by estimating the computational time aggregated by the conflict analysis and resolution employed in the FortNOX. As a result, the FortNOX conflict analysis showed , on average, an increase of 7ms in the processing time for each new flow rule request.
The authors of [38] introduced a security extension to the control plane to provide security management and arbitration of conflicts which originated from the insertion of multiple flow rules by distinct applications. The proposed extension layer, called the Security Enforcement Kernel (SEK), was implemented on top of the FloodLight controller. The SEK conducts a Rule-based Conflict Analysis (RCA) which acts as a conflict resolution mechanism that mediates all the requests for installing new flow rules. The SEK has the following components: an code authentication module; conflict detection and resolution; a state manager; callback tracking; a permitting mediator; a flow policy synchronizer; the separation of processes and a security audit service.
[39] present several attacks on controllers that violate the network topology and the forwarding strategy in the data plane of SDNs. In addition, it demonstrated the feasibility of launching attacks on four controllers: Maestro, POX, OpenDayLight and FloodLight. For this reason, the authors proposed a new controller, -SPHINX. This controller is capable of detecting attacks by dynamically learning new network behavior and giving an alert when it detects a suspicious activity. In the experiments, the authors evaluate the controllers with regard to the following attacks: ARP poisoning, Fake topology, Controller DoS, Network DoS, TCAM exhaustion and Switch blackhole. As a result, they observed the lack of resilience of OpenDayLight, FloodLight and POX to TCAM exhaustion, DoS and Fake topology attacks, respectively. They report the resilience of SPHINX to all the attacks carried out. Additionally, with respect to performance, the results show that SPHINX can verify 1, 000 policies at each network update in ≈ 245µs, by generating an increase of ≈ 6% and ≈ 14.5% in the processing and memory usage, respectively.
Security Analysis Regardless the Plane
In this section, we report the experimental approaches concerned with the evaluation of the security without taking account of any specific plane in the SDN architecture. For purposes of clarification , the approaches are grouped in accordance with their research objectives, as follows : Network fingerprinting threats, network topology threats, trust and risk assessment, virtualization threats and availability threats.
Network Fingerprinting Threats
The authors of [40] , [41] and [42] address the problem of the fingerprinting of controller-switch interactions in SDNs. By fingerprinting the SDN, an adversary can estimate the packet-forwarding logic, map the network topology and identify controllers, which are all factors that may expose the network to threats.
In [40] and [41] , the authors investigated the ability of a remote adversary to determine (passively or actively) if any flow rule installation has been triggered by a given packet. The rule of recognition attack is carried out by releasing new streams with a cross-traffic generator. The results are obtained by means of the statistical analysis of the Round-Trip Time (RTT) and packet-pair dispersion of these flows. The dispersion between packet pairs refers to the time interval between the complete transmission of two packets sent by a client on a particular link [40] . When conducting the statistical analysis, the authors consider two scenarios: in the first scenario, the packet does not trigger a new installation of rules, while in the second scenario the packet does. In the experiments, it was possible to determine that a packet is able to trigger the installation of a new flow with an accuracy of 98.54%.
In [42] , authors devised a network scanning tool called SDN scanner for remotely fingerprinting a SDN network. The SDN scanner sends fake packets to a particular target network and repeatedly estimates the response time of each packet. In this way, the tool can determine whether flows are new or already exist. Subsequently, the scanner statistically tests the samples from the two sets to determine whether a given network is SDN or not. This can be carried out by means of statistical tests, such as t-test 3 . As a result of the experiments, the tool achieved a fingerprinting rate of 85.7%.
Network Topology Threats
The authors of [43] evaluated the security in SDNs with a special focus on the OpenFlow protocol. In their study, the OpenFlow is analyzed on the basis of the STRIDE security threat categorization model. When conducting the analysis, a data flow diagram (DFD ) is used to model the OpenFlow so that it can be combined with the vulnerabilities of the STRIDE threat categorization model, and thus result in several Attack Trees. After the trees have been generated, practical tests are carried out to validate the approach, such as: Denial of Service (DoS) in the switch flow table, Denial of Service (DoS) in the switch input buffer and fingerprinting the network to determine if a rule exists on a switch and if the activity of a particular client can be tracked.
[44] assessed the security of the Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP), a variation of the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP). The OFDP is part of the OpenFlow software distribution. However, OFDP does not support authentication, integrity or confidentiality. Thus , it is susceptible to network topology poisoning attacks through spoofed links. The authors of [44] conducted experiments in which it was possible to create unidirectional and bidirectional false links by using one and two infected hosts, respectively. In another scenario consisting of five switches and five client hosts, the network connectivity is reduced by 30% through the creation of one false link. As an improvement, the authors suggest the use of a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to ensure authenticity and integrity in the network. The authors report that the use of OFDP with HMAC increases the network processing load by approximately 8%.
The authors of [45] examine attack vectors for SDNs based on the exploitation of false links. The attacks are intended to poison the topology of the network to mislead the core services of the controllers and applications. The authors found failures in the Host Tracking Service and Link Discovery Service systems in the SDN controllers. This led to a pair of poisoning attack groups in the network, namely Host Location Hijacking and Link Fabrication attacks. The Host Location Hijacking attack group encompasses Exploitation in Host Tracking Service (HTS) attacks, in which an adversary impersonates a legitimate host to capture the network traffic destined for the legitimate host, and the Web Clients Harvesting, where the attacker impersonates a legitimate web server. The Link Fabrication attack includes five variations: Exploitation in Link Discovery Service, Fake LLDP Injection, LLDP Relay, Denial of Service Attack, and MitM. The proposed attacks were successfully carried out on the FloodLight, OpenDayLight, Beacon and POX controllers. As an improvement, the authors added a new security extension to the Floodlight controller, called TopoGuard, which provides automatic and real-time detection of Network Topology Poisoning Attacks.
The study [46] analyses the impact of attacks to SDNs through the latency and packet loss observed in web services traffic. Without pointing out possible countermeasures, the authors discuss vulnerabilities and security threats, by highlighting the following : threats to SDN management, threats to the control plane and threats to the data plane. Two types of attacks were carried out. In the first attack, an adversary sends false requests as a means of keeping the controllers and switches busy, as well as causing delay and data loss. In the second attack, a malicious switch is employed to impersonate a legitimate switch, which leads to a loss of connection with the SDN controller.
Trust and Risk Assessment
The study conducted by [47] deals with the question of trust analysis in SDN controllers and their applications. The introduced approach relies on several redundant controllers that are capable of operating in different environments. The authors introduce an intermediate SDN layer that is located between the switches and the controllers, called Trust-oriented Controller Proxy (ToCP), and based on a hypervisor. The ToCP layer collects and analyses the rule installation requests originating from distinct controllers and if they are deemed consistent and trustworthy, it installs the rules on the network switches. The authors made an evaluation of ToCP in a SDN network by taking note of the throughput, packet loss, Jitter, memory and processing overheads. More specifically, the functionalities of ToCP increased the Jitter and packet loss and reduced the throughput by 13.6% in the worst case scenario. Similarly, the memory consumption and CPU usage were also increased by 401MB and 0.4%, respectively.
In [48] , the authors classified security threats by introducing a method of risk assessment and countermeasures for some of the security issues pointed out. They drew up a security checksheet to help network designers to determine risks and find suitable countermeasures to mitigate them. The list of attacks was combined with a prior list described in [49] . As an experiment, the authors first made a qualitative assessment of an SDN testbed by using the proposed checksheet. Afterwards, two Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were carried out to quantitatively measure the performance degradation of the network.
Virtualization Threats
The authors of [50] analyzed the FlowVisor, which allows network virtualization in SDNs. They found vulnerabilities in the FlowVisor isolation mechanism, which were at risk of being exploited by a malicious entity in the network. Moreover, the vulnerabilities that were found, allow traffic manipulation within different virtual networks. The authors state that FlowVisor does not verify permissions of SDN controllers. This allows a malicious controller to send packets to other controllers through FlowVisor. Thus, three variations of attacks were identified: the VLAN ID access problem, field modification problem and the wild card modification problem.
Availability threats
It is noteworthy that a great number of papers in the literature address the availability of resources by exploring Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in SDNs. Among them, we selected one study to represent this category in this review, [51] . A comprehensive review of Distributed DoS attacks on SDNs can be found in [52] .
In [51] , the authors carry out an experimental evaluation of the impact of DoS attacks on SDNs by looking at two types of DoS attacks against the control and data planes. In the data plane, they examine two types of attacks aimed at exhausting both the resources of the SDN controller and switches. The authors concluded that an adversary controlling a single host is able to disrupt the forwarding capability of a SDN network with relatively limited resources.
Experimental Environments for SDN Security Analysis
In this section, we present a comparative analysis of the literature. In the case of each research study analyzed, we examined the following features of the experiments conducted by the authors: the controllers used, the environments and their hardware and software configurations and the supporting tools for the security analysis.
Main Controllers
Currently, there exist hundreds of solutions for SDN controllers. Although many of the these correspond to proprietary distributions, in the literature we have sampled, most of the papers describe and validate SDN solutions for open source controllers. Table 1 lists the controllers that appear in the selected papers of the literature. The Table also shows the original version used of the controller or the contribution, if improvements have been made to the original controller. Notice that FloodLight is one of the most often used controllers with no modifications. We observed that the controllers chosen for modification are implemented in Java programming language. In these cases, the popularity of Java is a parameter that may indicate the trend with regard to preference. Table 2 shows the frequency in which the controllers appear in the papers we analyzed. The only controller based on proprietary software found in our review is HP VAN SDN, with a single occurrence. There are three controllers in the top-five of the list, which are implemented in Java: FloodLight in 1 st position, OpenDayLight in 3 rd , and Beacon in 4 th . There are two controllers implemented in Python, POX and RYU that are in 2 nd and 5 th places, respectively. Clearly, One may observe that the popularity of the programming language used in the design of the controller may be a strong indication of controller choice.
Experimental Environments
This section presents a data compilation of hardware and software used in the experiments of the analyzed studies. The experimental environments can Table 1 : List of controllers addressed in the related literature.
Paper
Controller (original) Contribution [27] OpenDayLight [40] Floodlight v0.9 [33] Floodlight e Beacon [28] Ryu [43] POX [34] Floodlight OperationCheckpoint [35] FloodLight, Beacon, OpenDayLight and HP VAN SDN Application containment mechanism with sandboxes over OpenDaylight Hydrogen [53] FloodLight, ONOS, OpenDayLight, Ryu and POX [44] POX [47] Floodlight v0.9 [36] OpenDayLight Helium [16] NOX, POX, Beacon, Floodlight, MuL, Maestro and Ryu [42] NOX, Beacon and Maestro [31] Floodlight, OpenDaylight, POX and Beacon Rosemary [32] Floodlight, OpenDaylight and ONOS [37] NOX 0.9. be grouped into three categories : simulated environment (SE), physical environment (PE) and emulated environment (EE). Table 3 shows the classification of the environments, as described in each paper regarding the three categories . The network emulator Mininet 4 was the predominant system in all the works that use emulated environments. Table 4 shows details of the software configuration of the experimental environments discussed in each study. In a few cases, the authors clearly indicated the use of virtual machines (VMs) and we check marked those cases where the authors did not state the name or the version of the VMs. With regard to the operating systems (OS), we included the name and version described in the experiments. In the switch column, we showed the number of switches used in the experiments, followed by the model of the switch (virtual/software or physical). The last column shows the number of hosts used in the experiments. All the blank cells refer to studies in which the related item was not described. 
Controller
Papers Amount FloodLight [40] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [53] , [16] , [31] , [32] , [30] , [39] , [38] , [45] , [47] , [29] , [51] 15 POX [43] , [53] , [44] , [16] , [31] , [46] , [50] , [39] , [45] 9
OpenDayLight [27] , [35] , [53] , [36] , [31] , [32] , [39] , [45] 8
Beacon [33] , [35] , [16] , [42] , [31] , [45] 6 RYU [28] , [53] , [16] , [48] , [45] , [ It should be noted that [32, 30, 29] did not specify any of the software used in their experiments. The overview, obtained from this data compilation, may support the choice for setups of SDN testbeds in future works, as well as providing the metrics and parameters required for qualitative evaluations between experimental platforms.
Main Supporting Tools for the Security Analysis
The use of consolidated supporting tools is essential for the experimental process. As well as making the process easier and providing greater reliability, consolidated tools can be cost-effective and save time employed in the design, implementation and deployment of a specific platform to conduct the experiments.
We enumerated the supporting tools of the literature and estimated the number of papers citing them. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the tools applied in security-related experiments in the analyzed literature. The Mininet emulation environment was the most common supporting tool. In the context of experimental evaluation in SDN, Mininet is a general purpose tool. It is able to emulate computer networks through virtualization, by enabling the use of fullfeatured virtual machines with lightweight operating systems, as well as switches capable of running all the OpenFlow protocols. When instantiating network elements through VMs, Mininet provides flexibility for fast prototyping of realistic network scenarios, with varied topologies and data transmission technologies. Apart from Mininet, there are two other important supporting tools for packet capturing and network analysis that often appear in the literature: scapy 5 and cbench 6 . Scapy is a packet manipulation software for capturing, creating, and modifying network packets. On the other hand, cbench is a benchmark tool that is able to configure a number of hosts and switches that generate workloads (packetin) to a target controller, while allowing its performance to be assessed through different QoS metrics such as latency and throughput. In the experiments described by the papers we have examined, scapy was used to generate and send a stream of specific packets or spurious messages to the network. Otherwise, cbench was generally used to measure the performance of the controllers. We noted that cbench was applied to determine the impact in the performance of controllers when a countermeasure is implemented as a new system functionality.
In addition to scapy and cbench, there are also other common tools used in the literature to perform several types of attacks, as well as for the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities in SDNs, such as:
• Kali Linux 7 : an operating system that provides a number of internal tools to find and exploit vulnerabilities in several networked computing systems. • Wireshark 8 and tcpdump 9 : sniffer software for capturing and analyzing data packets and network protocols.
• Nmap 10 : a software used to perform scanning of open ports on a target remote host.
• hping3 11 : a software for launching denial of service (DoS) attacks.
• arpspoof 12 : a software for supporting man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
• tcpreplay 13 : a software for capturing, modifying and injecting data packets.
Security Analysis of Controller Software
In this Section, we discuss the methods found in the literature dedicated to evaluating the controller software security in SDNs. First, we present a discussion about the methods used for security threat modeling. After this, we conduct a comparative analysis to show the relationship between the reported studies and security requirements defined by ONF. Finally, we introduce a taxonomy for the existing techniques applied to verify and validate the security requirements of Controller Software in SDNs. 
Security Threat Modeling and Classification
In the set of papers, we analyzed the Microsoft model for security threat classification (STRIDE) [17] and Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) appear as the most widely used threat modeling techniques. STRIDE, allows the security of a system to be classified into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges. With the aid of DFDs, the security analyst is able to make a graphical representation of the software components, the inputs and outputs, as well as the internal logical processes [54] . Besides STRIDE and DFD, there are other alternative methods to assist the modeling of threats and security vulnerabilities. One of them is the Attack Tree, which is able to classify the ways needed to detect a security breach. The last method, the Petri Net, is a classic mathematical modeling language.
------ Figure 4 illustrates the trend in the use of threat modeling techniques, as revealed in the number of published papers, during the years. Figure 5 shows trends regarding the interest in each STRIDE category, reflected in the number of papers addressing them. The greatest interest was displayed in the Denial of Service attack types since these can either lead to the network malfunction or collapse. However, there is also an increasing concern about spoofing threats.
With respect to security properties, Figure 6 illustrates the trend in the area of research, by showing the number of papers referring each security property. It should be noted that the terms "authentication" and "availability" are mentioned in most of the papers we analyzed. This is consistent with the occurrence of the related terms in the STRIDE model. However, it is also clear that authorization has also attracted greater attention in the last two years.
According to the review carried out, the STRIDE model is widely adopted and is currently the standard method for categorizing security threats [43] . We set out guidelines in our literature review with regard to security threats, by classifying the papers described in Section 3 based on the STRIDE model, as shown in Table 5 .
ONF's Security Requirements for SDN Controllers
To the best of our knowledge, the recommendations of ONF [13] are the first known security requirements defined for SDN controllers. There are several approaches in the literature that deal with network security in SDN, as discussed in the previous sections. However, they mostly focus on a single vulnerability or threat. The requirements defined in [13] are important because they provide the basis of a security analysis by stressing the need to evaluate several points of vulnerability.
Several surveys have been carried out with focus on the analysis of security in SDNs [5] , [7] , [15] , [16] , [3] . However, the ONF [13] report is a technical document containing a comprehensive practical coverage of security requirements for SDN controllers.
Although a security evaluation of SND controllers is presented in [13] , it is restricted to the analysis of five controllers for a subset of the ONF requirements. In light of this, there are open research issues for further investigation on the security of SDN controllers considering two scopes: in breadth, given that there is a wide diversity of controllers; and in depth, by taking into account all the ONF requirements. Table 6 lists the analyzed studies which address both the general and specific ONF security requirements [13] . On the one hand, it was noted that some requirements have attracted more interest among researchers, (in Table 6 items Hardware consistency -0 5
Hypervisor security -0 6
Software package integrity -0 7
Protecting the integrity of data in transit [28] , [55] , [44] , [45] 7, 9 of General Sec. Req. and items 6.a and 6.b of Specific Sec. Req.). On the other hand, several requirements were not addressed by any study (in Table 6 items 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 18 of General Sec. Req. and item 4 of Specific Sec. Req.). Among the papers we examined, only [27] does not fit into any ONF requirement. Since none of the requirements directly addresses the security in SDN switches, the study [27] was not included in Table 6 .
Dicussion
In most of the papers we analyzed, there is no concern about the details of the security evaluation methodology that was employed (e.g. description of techniques, experimental setup, assumptions, validation metrics and description of expected results). This lack of detail often hampers the reproducibility of the experiments, their continuation or the ability to compare the experimental results with those of other studies. We observed that the methods employed are restricted to the implementation of different attacks, which were designed to detect the vulnerabilities of the SDN controllers.
In addition, in the literature, there is a lack on the definition of groups and categories for the types of techniques used in the security analysis of SDN controllers. We propose a taxonomy as a contribution to fill this gap, which is illustrated in Figure 7 . This taxonomy classifies the security analysis process into two broad categories: active, when the analysis requires introducing of some action in the observed environment; and passive, when only desired events are passively observed in the environment. In the passive analysis, the capture and analysis of network packets were the most common techniques found in the literature employed to discover the network topology of a target SDN network.
On the basis of the review we carried out, the active security analysis can be divided into two branches: external, when the action happens is beyond the scope of the controller, i.e., when it occurs by means of the mediation of other nodes in the network; and internal, when the action takes place within the controller.
The active-external analysis comprises two techniques: the Control message generation where the message flow may be either from or to the controller and takes place by means of the (re)injection of original control messages (e.g., Man-in-the-Middle attack), malformed control messages, network topology control messages (e.g., fingerprint) or control messages carrying non-legitimate data (e.g., fake topology); and the Data flow Generation where the flow may be either from or to the controller, and occurs by means of the injection of an exhaustive data flow (e.g., DoS), a data flow to discover the SDN topology (e.g. fingerprint) or data flows conveying illegitimate data (e.g. arp poisoning).
The active-internal analysis can be divided into three main categories: implementation flaws, malicious applications and unexpected behavior of the controller. It should be noted that there is a close correlation between these three subcategories. At first sight they may seem similar, since a malicious application may accomplish an attack or an unexpected event may occur if there is a failure of implementation (i.e. vulnerability) in the controller. However, the first subcategory is most often related to flaws in the core of controllers regardless of the applications. The second, is related to the exploitation of security breaches by malicious applications disregarding any flaw in the controller. Otherwise, the last subcategory assesses the tolerance of the controller to unintentional threats in which legitimate applications may perform unauthorized/unexpected actions (e.g., an application may exhaust the primary memory, leading to collapse of the controller). Table 7 shows the classification of the approaches described in this survey according to the proposed taxonomy for the experimental security analysis of the SDN controllers. It is worth noting that some studies may appear in more than one category, since they perform different experiments to detect vulnerabilities in the controllers. It has been found that a greater effort has been made by the academic community to conduct active-external analysis through the exhaustive generation of data flows and the active-internal analysis of Malicious Software. These attempts reflect a concern that is consistent with the severity of the security breach in those cases, which may lead to the controller and also, at some point, the network becoming unavailable.
Future Directions
The literature provides a range of heterogeneous techniques that can be used although there is a lack of a common methodology for experimental security analysis, that is applicable to the overall SDN, and in particular, the controller [40] software. Such methodology is important to enable SDN designers to improve the resilience of the controller core and the resistance of applications to attacks.
As the SDN technologies differ on the programming languages and environments, they require some level of abstraction in the definition of this methodology. However, a methodology for security analysis should at least describe the techniques used, the metrics for validation and a list of expected results. Moreover, it is also preferable to include automatic tests to quantify and certify the security level of the controller software with regard to the ONF requirements, regardless of the hardware configuration.
Final Remarks
In this paper we carried out an extensive review of the literature regarding the security of controller software in SDNs. We compiled the main features of the experimental setups and highlighted the many factors involved in the experimental security evaluation of SDN controllers.
With regard to the controller software, the literature review showed a tendency of studies related to security issues involving the OpenDayLight, POX and Floodlight controllers. In addition, we enumerated the most common hardware configuration and tools used to support the experimental security analysis. Among these tools, the results pointed out a large preference for the use of Mininet emulator. With regard to security threat modeling, the review found that the STRIDE model was widely adopted. This study makes a contribution to the field by classifying literature considering the STRIDE model. Furthermore, we analyzed the relation of the literature to the ONF security requirements and identified the requirements that were met by each study. Lastly, we created a taxonomy of the different approaches found in the literature review considering the techniques employed used in their experimental security analysis.
It should be stressed that the literature regarding the experimental security analysis of the implementation of the network controllers is still limited. Despite the great academic interest in SDN security, there is still a lack of research on finding a common methodology for automatically evaluating the security of SDN controllers. Additionally, there is also an absence of methodologies and techniques for automatic risk analysis to estimate the extent of the damage that an insecure controller can inflict on the network.
